Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Department of Computer Science Technical
Reports

Department of Computer Science

2005

FT-RC4: A Robust Security Mechanism for Data Stream Systems
Mohamed Ali
Mohamed ElTabakh
Cristina Nita-Rotaru
Purdue University, crisn@cs.purdue.edu

Report Number:
05-024

Ali, Mohamed; ElTabakh, Mohamed; and Nita-Rotaru, Cristina, "FT-RC4: A Robust Security Mechanism for
Data Stream Systems" (2005). Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 1638.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/1638

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

FT-RC4:
FT-RC4: AA ROBUST
ROBUSTSECURITY
SECURITYMECHANISM
MECHANISM
FOR
FOR DATA
DATA STREAM
STREAMSYSTEMS
SYSTEMS
Mohamed
MohamedAli
Ali
Mohamed
MohamedEITabakh
ElTabakh
Cristina
CristinaNita-Rotaru
Nita-Rotaru
Department
Departmentof
ofComputer
ComputerSciences
Sciences
Purdue
PurdueUniversity
University
West
WestLafayette,
Lafayette,IN
IN 47907
47907
CSD
CSDTR
TR#05-024
#05-024
November
November2005
2005

FT-RC4:
FT-RC4: A Robust Security
Security Mechanism for Data
Stream Systems
Mohamed Ali,
Ali. Mohamed EITabakh. and Cristina Nita-Rotaru
Department of Computer Scicnce. Purdue University.
West Lafayetle.
Lalhyette. IN 47906.
47906. USA
{mhali.
{mhali. mellabak. crisn@cs.purdue.edu}
crisn@cs.p~~rdue.edu)

the fast on-line proAbstract. Stream database systems are designed to support Ihe
cessing that characterizes many new emerging
emergin: applications such as sensor-based
environments.
environments, on-line business processing and network monitoring.
monitoring. Data stream
processing is a highly demanding environlllent
environment where streams are usually infilo limited buffer storage or
nite. bursty. and running at high arrival rates. Due to
real-time constraints, data items may be dropped out of the system and lost for
ever. In many applications. sensitive stream data needs to be secured against malicious atlacks.
attacks. Various security mechanisms have been well studied in literature.
However, these mechanisms are not
no1 lUned
tuned to
10work in the lossy streaming envipro\'ide security services
ronment. Stream security mechanisms are required to provide
and to be fault-tolerant as well.
In this paper we identify the security requirements
require~ncntsfor data stream systems. fofocusing
Nile. a prototype query processing engine for data streams developed
cusinp on Nile.
Purdue University.
for data stream sysat Pur-due
Ui~i~:ersir\..
We first propose a security architecture
archi~ectl~re
tems. then focus on a particular
particular service:
service: data integrity and confidentiality. We
present a new mechanism. FT-RC4.
FT-RC4, that provides data integrity and confidentiality.
ity. We demqnstrate
demonstrate its practicality by implementing it inside our prototype data
stream system and evaluating
evaluatin_g its performance.
performance.

1 Introduction
The Internet revolution, and more recently the wide-spread use of wireless and sensor networks, created a paradigm shift in the way information is accessed and processed,
monitoring, surveillance,
cessed- generating new applications such as real-time network monitoring:
tracking, plant maintenance, telecommunications, data management and environmental
monitoring. Such applications are fundamentally different in the way they produce data
and perform queries [I).
[ I ] . They continuously generate large volumes of data streams
obtained from the environment they operate in.
in. Data streams can be obtained from
multiple sources at high-arrival (possibly unpredictable) rates. They are continuous and
n~ultiple
unbounded. The transitive
transitive characteristic of the data makes storing and processing the
whole data infeasible. Data items may be dropped from the buffers and lost for ever if
they are not processed in a timely fashion.
fashion. Queries that are applied on such data streams
are not only snapshot queries,
queries: but also continuous queries in which the same query is
incrementally evaluated each time new input arrives. Processing is performed on a sliding window over the stream to limit the attention to the most recent data items and
overcome the infiniteness of the stream.
stream.
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As data stream applications
classified (military
applications process sensitive data that is often classified
applications) or private (financial,
(financial. health applications. etc.) there is an obvious need for
providing security services
services not only for
fol- the applications but for the data stream systems
themselves. A comprehensive
comprehensive survey of security and privacy requirements and open
issues
of
issues for
for a particular type of stream databases that is generated by a large number of
sensors
sensors is
is presented in [6].
[6].Below we present the main security services that any data
stream system that is concerned with security should consider:

-- Authentication:
Authe17tication:authenticates a client when iitt requests access to the system.
-- Access control
checks if a given client is authorized to register
colitrol and
arid authorization:
autho~-ieatiori:
data streams
streams or perform queries on streams.
streams.
-- Data confidentiality:
guarantees that only intended parties can understand the conco~ijderitialitj.:
tent of the stream,
stream, the query,
quei-y.or
01- the result.
I-esult.
-- Data integrity:
integrity: ensures that data is in the form that is intended by the originator and
is
is not corrupted intentionally or
01- unintentionally.
-- Data non-repudiation:
ensures that a party that performed an operation can not
lion-I-ep~rdintio~l:
deny that he did it. This service is useful for audit purposes.
-- Data privacy:
privacj.: defines what is the minimum information that should be disclosed
and provides ways of protecting personal information even after it was disclosed to
other parties.
validit!,: ensures that data generated contains meaningful and correct
-- Data validity:
COlTect (nonmisleading) information in the generated data streams.
streams.
-- Survivability
Survivabilig~:provides system recovery from either an attack or a failure and ensures that a service is available.
Securih policy: all the above security mechanisms must be governed by a security
-- Security
policy.
policy.
Most of the security requirements listed above are not necessarily specific to data
systems. However,
However: most of them are more difficult to provide for data streams
stream systems.
solutions cannot be applied directly because of
of the high-demand
high-demand characwhere standard solutions
environment. Additional research is needed to overcome the challenges
teristics of the environment.
posed of the new paradigm. One challenge is reconciling application-specific
application-specific requireservices in a high-demand environment. For example, many appliments with security services
cations such as medical applications [7].
171. require privacy of data, but also audit capabilcations
ity. Solutions
Solutions proposed to address this problem, provide the desired audit capabilities
capabilities
ity.
and preserve privacy, but have a high associated cost that makes them prohibitive to
real-time data stream systems.
systems.
Another challenge originates from the conflict between security and real-time processing. For example,
example. providing fine-granularity access control and authorization
authorization can
cessing.
have a negative effect on the real-time processing because of
of the additional processing
overhead. Another example is providing data confidentiality for data streams. Although
overhead.
Although
stream ciphers
ciphers [8]
181 seem to provide the desired performance for data streams.
streams, they fail
to operate correctly when there is a de-synchronization between the keystream
key stream and the
encrypted data.
data. Such a de-synchronization is very likely to occur in an environment
environment
where data can be dropped or lost either at the corn~~~ur~icatiori
communication level because of
of the high
transmission rate,
rate. or at the application level because of
the
limited
storage
capability
of
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and processing power. The real-time processing does not allow for trying to recover the
data via retransmissions.
retransmissions.
Several systems were designed to cope with the demanding performance of data
streams.
streams. They include: STREAM [2],
[2], Aurora [3],
[3]: and Nile [4].
141. However, none of them
focused on providing security services.
services.
The work presented in this paper is a first
first step in addressing security concerns for
data stream systems,
systems. focusing on data integrity and confidentiality. The research in this
paper is conducted in the context of the Nile [4]
[4] prototype data stream system.
system. Our main
contributions
are:
contributions
-- We identify security services for data stream systems and propose a secure architecture for a prototype data stream system.
system.
-- We focus on data integrity and confidentiality and propose a mechanism appropriate
to data streams. Our scheme,
scheme, Ff-RC4,
FT-RC4? is able to withstand data loss and recover
from it by re-synchronizing the encrypted data with the corresponding keystream.
-- We demonstrate the applicability of Ff-RC4
FT-RC4 to data streams by implementing it in
the discussed prototype data stream system and by evaluating it over realistic data
streams.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
follows. We overview related work in
Section 2. We describe how security services can be accommodated in the architecture
of an existing data stream system in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on data integrity and
confidentiality and presents the design of our scheme,
scheme, Ff-RC4.
FT-RC4. Section 5 evaluates the
performance of the proposed mechanism. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.
6.

2 Related Work
In this section,
section. we overview the related work in several directions related to the security of data streams in particular and databases in generaL
general, These directions can be
summarized as follows:
follows:
Security for Stream Databases. To the best of our knowledge, there is very little
work that focuses on the security requirements and services for data streams systems.
systems.
A significant work in this direction is the work in [6]
[6] that overviews the main research
directions and challenges in security for sensor network databases. The paper points
out, among other issues, the need for robust security mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that
not only provide security services,
services: but are also fault-tolerant.
Access Control for Database Systems. Significant work has been conducted in the
area of providing access control to traditional database systems [9].
[9]. Some of the work
focused on investigating how several access control models can be applied to databases
(for example RBAC [10]).
[I 01). Another topic in this area focuses on providing access control [I
[I I],
/ ] >protection and administration to XML data sources [12].
[I?]. More recent results
analyze what are the requirements and mechanisms that need to be provided in query
processing in order to provide very fine-grained access control (at the level of individual
[ 131.
tuples) [13].
Data Confidentiality and Integrity. Block ciphers,e.g.,
ciphers,e.g.? DES [14]
[I41 and AES [15],
[15],
has been proposed to provide data confidentiality. Although they are widely used, their
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performance makes them prohibitive to data streams.
streams. Another type of ciphers,
ciphers. stream
ciphers,
ciphers: (such
(such as RC4 [16])
[16]) have performance that makes them appropriate for streams.
streams.
Several techniques have been proposed to provide data integrity. They were based on
hashing techniques to calculate authentication bits that can be viewed as a digest of the
messages. MD5 [17],
[17], SHA
SHA1I [18]
[IS] and HMAC [19]
[19] are examples of these techniques.
Our work builds on existing work in providing data integrity and confidentiality.
confidentiality.

3

A Security
Security Architecture for Data Stream
Stream Systems
Systems

In this section, we discuss how some of the security services presented in Section 1,
1. can
be achieved in data stream systems.
systems. We extend the architecture of a data stream systems
to accommodate components that are specially designed to provide security services.
Figure 11 shows the main architectural components of our prototype data stream sysStream Registration component is the inteliace
inte~facebetween the stream generators
tem. The Strea~n
and the system. Its main function is to register new streams into the system. Queries
Registration component in order to get access to
need to be registered by the Query Registratio~z
the streams inside the system.
system. The Stream Manager component handles multiple inEngine
coming streams and acts as a buffer between the streams sources and the Query E11gi11e
where query processing takes place. The Storage Manager component is responsible for
building and maintaining summaries over data streams, allowing the system to answer
queries efficiently. The above described system is extended with two basic components.
The first component handles authentication, encryption, integrity and non-repudiation
non-repudiation
management inservices. It is responsible for authenticating clients,
clients! performing key managemenl,
tegrity and encryption and decryption operations. These services are end-to-end services, thus the component is placed at the outer level of the system. The second component handles access control policies. It is responsible for making sure that queries are
performed by authorized clients who have access to the targeted streams.
streams. This component is placed into the system after the query and stream registration phase to keep track
of which queries are allowed to access which streams.
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Fig.
2. The effect of lost data items
Fig.2.
ilems on RC4 (a) original image (b) received image
imase
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FT-RC4
FT-RC4 Design

A basic security service that is necessary for data streams is data confidentiality and
integrity. In this section we focus
focus on this service.
Stream ciphers, such as RC4 [16]
[I61 provide the performance required by the highdemand environment of data streams.
streams. The main mechanism of such ciphers is to generate a key
stream based on a shared secret key.
keystream
key. The generated keystream is then XOR-ed
with the original stream to obtain the encrypted stream.
stream. The decryption operation is performed in a similar manner as the encryption:
encryption: the keystream is recreated at the receiver
side, then XOR-ed with the encrypted stream to obtain the original data. Stream ciphers,
including RC4 are vulnerable to de-synchronization between the key
stream and the cikeystream
phertext, in case of data loss.
loss. Figure 2 shows that RC4 [16]
[I61 fails to decrypt the data
after it encounters the first error due to the de-synchronization between the key
stream
keystream
and the incoming data stream.
To overcome this problem,
problem: we propose FT-RC4, that builds on the design of RC4.
FT-RC4 extends RC4 to work in the lossy streaming environment,
environment: where recovering the
data through retransmissions is not an option. Figure 3 presents the design of FT-RC4.
FT-RC4 consists of three steps taken at the sender side and other corresponding three
lT-RC4
steps at the receiver side. The sender divides the stream into cycles of fixed length.
length. After
encrypting each cycle, the sender appends synchronization and integrity bits immediately after each cycle.
cycle. The receiver uses these extra bits to check the integrity of data. If
If
the cycle is believed to be conupted,
con-upted, it is thrown away or replaced by zeros. Otherwise,
the synchronization bits are used to adjust the keystream and decrypt the cycle. For each
cycle, the following
following steps are performed at the sender side:
side:
I.
1. The input stream is XOR-ed with the keystream to obtain an encrypted stream.
stream.
2. The encrypted stream is passed through a position registrar to punctuate the stream
stream positiotl
position locating
with the current position of the stream by appending strearn
locatirzg bits.
(Notice that position bits mayor
may or may not be encrypted depending on whether we
are interested in hiding stream contents or contents plus position as well. This encryption is done through a separate encryption step and may use a different key and
technique.)
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3.
3. The encrypted stream and position punctuation is passed through an integrity enforcer to hash the current cycle and obtain integrity
iritegritj bits that are considered as the
cycle digest that verifies the stream integrity.
integrity.
As mentioned above, the receiver does not have the ability to recover the lost data.
data.
Thus, the receiver goals are to detect a loss and then resynchronize the keystream with
the incoming encrypted stream. Corrupted cycles are considered lost, while correct cycles are decrypted and if data loss occurred, used to resynchronize the keystream for
Integrity bits are used to check the integrity for each cycle,
further decryption. Integriy
cycle, while
stream locating
locatbzg bits are used to fast forward the keystream till it is repositioned at the
correct position. Due to the bursty nature of streams, enors
errors are usually close-by, destroying one cycle and leaving others unconupted.
uncorrupted. At the receiver side, the following
steps are canied
c a ~ ~ i eover:
d
I.
1. The receiver slides a window of the same size as the cycle length over the received
encrypted stream.
stream. It calculates the same hash function and checks the integrity bits.
If
If integrity checks, the cycle is considered correct, otherwise, it is considered to be
corrupted and thrown away.
away. (Notice that the hash function
function should be evaluated incrementally as the window slides [20]
[20] to allow the efficient computation of integrity
bits as one data item gets into the window and another one leaves it.)
2. For a correct cycle, the position locating bits are used to fast forward the stream to
the correct position and to inform the decryptor to report data loss to the client, and
perhaps add filling values instead of the corrupted
c o ~ ~ u p t eones.
d These filling values would
be of interest to some applications,
applicationst e.g.,
e.g., images where image size is important.
3,
key stream is XOR-ed with the encrypted stream to obtain the original
3. The adjusted keystream
data stream.
FT-RC4 is able to detect corrupted portions and is able to readjust the keystream in
order to segain
regain synchronization.
synchronization. In Figure 4 we show the same image from Figure 2,

FT-RC4:
FT-RC4: A Robust Security
Security Mechanism for Data Stream Systems
Systems
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(b)

(a)

Fig.
rate, (b)
Fig.4.
4.The effect of lost data items
items on FT-RC4:
FT-RC4: (a)
(a) 1%
I % loss rate.
(b) 5% loss rate

encrypted with FT-RC4,
FT-RC4, under two loss rates. Figure 4 shows that FT-RC4 recovers
from lost data and continues the decryption process (whereas RC4 generated garbage
after the first error it encountered). Although the image gets distorted as the loss rate
increases, it is still viewable.
viewable.
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Experiments

In this section,
section. we evaluate the performance of FT-RC4 inside the Nile data stream
system.
system. We implement FT-RC4 inside Nile and perfOllli
perfolm experiments using a real data
Each
store is sending its transactions to
set generated from Wal*Mart I retail stores.
stores.
a centralized data stream system for online processing. Each transaction comes in the
ItemID, Price,
Price, Quantit);
form of <StoreID,
<StorelD, ItemlD,
Quantit~;TimeStamp>.
TitneStat~zp>.A sample query "Q",
"Q", shown
is
performed
on
the
system
side
under
different
rates
of
uniform
information
in Figure 5,
5?
loss.
loss. The query calculates the total revenue by multiplying the price of each item by the
associated sold quantity and accumulating the sum.
sum. A window operator of 5 minutes
is placed to limit the attention to the most recent five minutes. The window format is
windolV
seconds, mseconds).
window (hour,
(/?our;minutes,
tnb~utes,seconds,
tnseconds).
SELECT
SELECT SUM(R
SUM(R1l.PriceO
.Price() * R I.Quantity())
l.Quantity())
FROM Retail Il R I1
WINDOW 00.05.00.00:
00.05.00.00:
Fig.
Fig.5.
5. Query "Q"
"Q" syntax

Figure 6 shows the result of query "Q"
"Q" under different Joss
loss rates. The figure shows
that FT-RC4
FT-RC4 is able to produce answers that are very close to the ones in a non-lossy
environment.
environment. The lower the loss rate is, the more accurate results are obtained. The
obtained result is always less than the exact one due to replacing the lost bytes with
zeros which in turn decreases the sum,
sum value. Figure 7 shows the normalized mean
square error (MSE)
(MSE) between the exact and obtained answers.
answers. The horizontal segments

' Data was supplied by Wal*Mart and NCR Corporations
Corporations

I
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of the curves indicate that the newly-aniving
newly-arriving tuples as well as the expiring tuples are
both correct tuples. Therefore. they do not change the MSE.
MSE. The positive-slope segments indicate that the newly-aniving
newly-an-iving tuples are lost and replaced by zeros. Finally, the
negative-slope segments indicate that expiring tuples are zero-replaced tuples, and their
expiration reduces the MSE. As expected, the MSE increases with the increase of the
loss rate. Increasing the loss rate increases the magnitude and number of positive and
negative slope segments.
Figure 8 shows the processing time for the FT-RC4 under different cycle sizes.
Notice that FT-RC4 requires more processing time than RC4 due to augmenting the
stream with synchronization bytes. The figure shows that as the cycle size increases the
processing time decreases because the number of the synchronization bytes decreases.
decreases.
Figure 99 shows the effect of the cycle size in the recovery process. As the cycle size
increases, more data is lost. This is because in FT-RC4,
FT-RC4: if an error occurs in a cycle,
cycle. the
whole cycle is lost.
lost. Finer granularities of cycles offer a better chance of recovery, at an
additional processing overhead.

6

Conclusions

In this paper, we outlined the desired security services for data streams and suggested
an architecture for data stream systems that provides such services. We discussed the
challenges encountered when designing security services for data streams, emphasizing
the interaction between fault-tolerance
fault-tolerance and security.
We exemplified why standard solutions can not directly be applied in a lossy stream
environment where data loss recovery through retransmissions is not possible, by focusfocusing on data integrity and confidentiality. We proposed a new scheme FT-RC4 designed
specifically to cope with the requirements of data streams and showed its usefulness by
implementing it and evaluating it in the context of a prototype data stream system.
This work is just
just the first step towards a secure data stream system. We plan to
perform further evaluations of our scheme under different application scenarios, with
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just outlined In
various requirements. In
I n addition, there are several other services we
w e just
in
this paper and which require further research.
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